Sunday, December 30, 2007

EL Defenzor.net: Nueces Democrats: We dont know that Joe Benavides will make a better Commissioner than the incumbent

EL Defenzor.net: Nueces Democrats: We dont know that Joe Benavides will make a better Commissioner than the incumbent

Sunday, December 30, 2007

JOE BENAVIDES

Joe Benavides a Retired Marine and Teacher Fighting for Our Children

Many in our community know Joe Benavides as not only a retired Marine and combat veteran, but a nonstop community volunteer. For the past several years Benavides has worked tirelessly helping our elderly by coordinating children (many of them court-ordered) to cut lawns, remove debris and help the elderly by taking away some of the burdens they face.

Now Benavides, is helping children by intervening through becoming a teacher. Benavides has done a remarkable job at the Adult Learning Center by helping children obtain their education. He has also worked with many community leaders and business owners such as Pete’s Chicken and More, Flint Hills, Valero, Greenwood Doors and many, many other leaders to provide support in saving our children. The drop out rate has nearly doubled over the last two decades in Texas. Many programs that were previously there to aid our children have been underfunded and the educational system is in crisis. Private citizens like Benavides have risen to the challenge and not only gotten children and parents involved in striving to complete their high school degree, but also to have the potential and financial wherewithal to attend college.

Education is Our Freedom is a well-recognized program spearheaded by Judge Joe A. Gonzalez and Joe Benavides. The program has aided over a hundred children who many in our community had given up on obtain not only their high school education but also attend college. The program has been such a success that funding and success rates have doubled each year since it inception. “We must help our children and pay for programs upfront. Whether you or a conservative or a liberal it is important to pay for preventative programs such as Education is Our Freedom in order to create a workforce that not only has education as a goal but that prepares today’s youth for the workforce tomorrow” said Benavides.

We at the Defenzor wish to commend Mr. Benavides for the efforts he has made over several years and also his sacrifices for his country. His eldest son has followed in his father’s footsteps and has answered the call to duty and is a two year Marine Corps veteran and is soon to be deployed to Iraq. Joe Benavides is a man that has never stopped sacrificing and never stopped serving our country. In this New Year we extend our warmest wishes to Joe Benavides and the efforts he is making with at-risk teens. IF ANYONE IN THE COMMUNITY WISHES TO HELP OUR YOUTH IN THESE PROGRAMS CONTACT JOE BENAVIDES AT 361-633-9308.



Nueces Democrats: We dont know that Joe Benavides will make a better Commissioner than the incumbent


With this precinct I have not a vote however, the County Commissioners are engaged towards progress for our community as a whole.

Dannoynted1:
"Our Large Family attended the "Annual Feast of Sharing" event held at the Bayfront Plaza.

Joe Benavides was one of our servers (i believe he was a soft drink server), and Mrs.Banales also was there with her husband.

I will not talk about the burnt tamale(only I got) but lets just say the mashed potatoes were the best my man says the rolls were the best.

Considering it is election time, I am surprised most politicians were absent. But with the way they rushed you out after you ate, You certainly did not have any time to "network".

The candidates that did attend, I apologize for not mentioning you as I was there only a small window of time..."


It was so different from the last time I went, which with regret, was not last year.

I must say the food was better at the events that cost money."

JK:

We dont know that Joe Benavides will make a better Commissioner than the incumbent but I do know Joe was working and he volunteered out of his commitment to the community. Joe has over the years volunteered and donated his services diligently. One might argue he is only volunteering his time and services because he wants to "get elected".

I dont believe this is the case. I have known Joe for a little over two years and I know his father. In the past, Joe Benavides has run a couple of times for office but, he volunteers regardless of whether he is running or not.

Will Joe Benavides continue to volunteer if he wins?

We can only know after we vote for him.

We do know his incumbent opponent was not volunteering at the Feast of Sharing.

We do know Joe Benavides' incumbent opponent was parading around with her hubby in tow. Was she making a statement? The message IMO was she is not worried about her challenger, she does not take him serious and she is not going to change her routine ways for her constituents. We do not know how she represents her constituency but we do know she is not going to change it.

All we can do is allow Joe Benavides to tell us how is going to represent his constituents.

We can ask him questions and hear his answers.

With Joe Benavides' incumbent opponent we dont have to ask her anything because we have her record to refer to.

The only thing I remember is that, "She could work harder" if she gave herself a pay raise.

I also know she was walking around when she should have been working.

As far as the Family name and integrity, we might should ask the ME about the trangressions.

Ask her about the real reason she decided to run.

Friday, December 28, 2007

Parkdale Bank: Ray Mc Murrey Is From Here, He Still Believes Like It Says In The Intro, "I'll be a straight-shooter & a square-dealer "& He Does "Reme

Parkdale Bank: Ray Mc Murrey Is From Here, He Still Believes Like It Says In The Intro, "I'll be a straight-shooter & a square-dealer "& He Does "Remember The Alamo"


"I'll be as hardy of mind as I am of body. I'll be a straight-shooter and a square-dealer. My family name will be sacred My word will be as good as any contract. I'll remember the Alamo. I'll stick by my friends. And I'll eat more chicken-fried steak."

"We do not win by replacing a corporate Republican with a corporate Democrat," said Mr. McMurrey, speaking to about a dozen supporters at an East Austin residence.


Ray told me this before he spoke at his Official Announcement to run against the Corporate Democratic Military Industrial Complex Candidate for Texas US Senator.

A very passionate candidate who is anything other than a fake or what some like to call a politician.

Ray is not a Politician and this is a very very positive attribute.

Dont get me wrong he is very well suited for the Senate and the diplomacy is there but there is a sternness that demands his respect kind of like the respect and command he possesses in the classroom. I think we can all agree, if he can handle our youth in the classroom he will do well for us in Washington.

Two more things

Remember the Alamo

and

Stay tuned for Jan 2 next year.

"We do not win by replacing a corporate Republican with a corporate Democrat," said Mr. McMurrey, speaking to about a dozen supporters at an East Austin residence.


Ray Mc Murrey is from Corpus Christi.

He tells us upfront of his progressive leanings and his disappointment in both of the Hegemonic Parties.

Hegemony,.... Watch the Movie "Hot Fuzz".

Wednesday, December 12, 2007

Impending transfer of physical possession of the children or a trial court’s unreasonable delay in entering an educational institution to a prison pip

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS



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No. 04-1043

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In re Texas Department of Family and Protective Services





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On Petition for Writ of Mandamus

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Justice Wainwright delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Jefferson, Justice Hecht, Justice Brister, Justice Medina, Justice Green, Justice Johnson, and Justice Willett joined.



Justice O’Neill filed a dissenting opinion.





We deny Joy Higdon’s motion for rehearing. We withdraw our opinion of September 22, 2006 and substitute the following in its place.

Section 263.401 of the Texas Family Code establishes a deadline for rendition of a final order in suits affecting the parent-child relationship (SAPCRs) brought by the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services. Although the trial court abused its discretion in failing to dismiss the Department’s case, we conclude that here, the parties challenging the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss under section 263.401 had an adequate remedy by accelerated appeal.

On January 23, 2003, the Department filed a SAPCR to terminate the parent–child relationship between Joy Higdon and her two children. That day, the trial court entered an ex parte order giving the Department the authority to take possession of the children, naming the Department temporary managing conservator, and setting the matter for a full adversarial hearing on February 3, 2003. Apparently, Higdon was restored as managing conservator of the children at the February hearing but agreed to place the children with their great-grandmother, Ruby Ludwig.

The trial court held periodic status hearings. In a temporary order dated August 19, 2003, the trial court appointed the Department temporary managing conservator and identified the dismissal date for the case as August 16, 2004. The children continued to reside with Ludwig. In September, the trial court identified the dismissal date for the Department’s case as January 26, 2004, and set the case for trial on the merits. In January, the trial court extended the dismissal date to July 24, 2004, as permitted by section 263.401(b) of the Texas Family Code. On February 23, 2004, Ludwig intervened, seeking sole managing conservatorship of the children.

On Monday, July 19, 2004, the trial began. On Thursday, July 22, 2004, Ludwig and Higdon filed motions to dismiss for failure to render a final order before the statutory deadline. The Department rested its case on Friday, July 23, 2004. Saturday, July 24, 2004, was the dismissal deadline identified by the court in its January order. The trial recommenced on Tuesday, July 27, 2004. On July 28, 2004, the jury returned a unanimous verdict terminating the parent-child relationship between Higdon and each child and appointing the Department, rather than Ludwig, as sole managing conservator of the children. The trial court announced the verdict from the bench, terminated the parental rights of the fathers of the children, and denied the motions to dismiss. A hearing for entry of judgment was set for August 11, 2004. The trial court rendered judgment on Higdon’s parental rights and Ludwig’s intervention when it signed and filed the final decree of termination on August 13, 2004.

On August 11, 2004 and August 12, 2004, Ludwig and Higdon, respectively, filed petitions for writ of mandamus with the court of appeals seeking to compel the trial court to dismiss the case for failure to render a final order before the dismissal date. On October 21, 2004, the court of appeals granted mandamus relief and ordered the trial court to dismiss the Department’s case. On November 18, 2004, the court of appeals denied the Department’s motion for rehearing, correctly noting that Ludwig’s intervention would be unaffected by the dismissal of the Department’s SAPCR. The next day, the Department filed a petition for writ of mandamus in this Court and a motion to stay further proceedings. This Court granted the motion to stay.

Mandamus relief is proper only to correct a clear abuse of discretion when there is no adequate remedy by appeal. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135‑36 (Tex. 2004); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. 1992). The issuance of mandamus by the court of appeals is improper if the trial court did not abuse its discretion or if the record fails to demonstrate the lack of an adequate remedy on appeal. In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 135‑36; Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Tex. 1985). A trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to apply the law correctly, so we consider the trial court’s legal ruling. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839-40.

In construing a statute, our objective is to determine and give effect to the Legislature’s intent. McIntyre v. Ramirez, 109 S.W.3d 741, 745 (Tex. 2003). To determine the Legislature’s intent, we look to the statute’s plain language and the common meaning of the statute’s words. Id. Subsection 263.401(a) of the Texas Family Code requires a trial court to dismiss a SAPCR filed by the Department if a final order has not been rendered by the first Monday after the one-year anniversary of the date when the trial court appointed the Department temporary managing conservator. The statute allows a maximum extension of 180 days. Tex. Fam. Code § 263.401(b), (c). If the trial court has not rendered a final order at the expiration of the additional 180 days, the court must dismiss the SAPCR. Id. § 263.401(c). Section 263.403, entitled “Monitored Return of Child to Parent,” provides an exception to the dismissal rule, but it is not applicable to this case.

Higdon argues the time period described in subsection 263.401(a) began running on the day the trial court entered its ex parte orders. She calculates the first Monday after the one-year anniversary of the January 23, 2003 ex parte order as January 26, 2004. After adding a 180-day extension, she argues the dismissal deadline was Saturday, July 24, 2004. The Department argues that the January 23, 2003 ex parte order that gave the Department temporary conservatorship did not trigger the section 263.401 time period. Instead, the Department contends that the period began after the August 11, 2003 hearing, making the dismissal deadline August 15, 2004.

The Department obtained temporary managing conservatorship by order of the trial court on January 23, 2003. Thus, the statutory time period started on January 23rd because a court “rendered a temporary order appointing the department as temporary managing conservator.” Tex. Fam. Code § 263.401(a). Nothing in the statute excludes the Department’s fourteen-day conservatorship obtained through the ex parte order from the calculation of the dismissal deadline in section 263.401. We therefore determine the deadline to be the date of the Monday following the one-year anniversary of January 23, 2003, which is January 26, 2004.

On January 26, 2004, the trial court held a permanency hearing at which the court concluded that a 180-day extension of this dismissal deadline was in the best interest of the children, as permitted by subsection 263.401(b) of the Texas Family Code and set the dismissal date for July 24, 2004. We agree that July 24, 2004 was the dismissal deadline for the Department’s SAPCR. The trial court erred when it failed to render a final order by that deadline.

Parties may waive complaints about a trial court’s failure to render a timely final order. Section 263.402 describes the vehicles by which a party can obtain a dismissal: a timely motion to dismiss or a motion requesting the court to render a final order before the deadline for dismissal. A timely motion to dismiss must be filed before the Department introduces all of its evidence, other than rebuttal evidence. Id. § 263.402(b). A motion requesting the court to render a final order must be made before the dismissal deadline passes. Id. The Department argues that Ludwig’s and Higdon’s motions to dismiss were not timely made.

On July 19, 2004, the trial began. On Thursday, July 22, 2004, Ludwig and Higdon made motions to dismiss based on the Saturday, July 24 dismissal deadline. The Department rested its case on Friday, July 23. On Wednesday, July 28, 2004, the jury returned a unanimous verdict terminating the parent-child relationship between Higdon and each child and appointing the Department, rather than Ludwig, sole managing conservator of the children. The trial court read the verdict, terminated the parental rights of the fathers, and denied both motions to dismiss. Higdon and Ludwig complied with the statutory deadline by filing before the Department rested and had ripe motions to dismiss before the trial court when the deadline passed. The trial court abused its discretion by failing to dismiss the Department’s SAPCR within the statutory time period as requested by Higdon’s and Ludwig’s timely motions.

Now we must determine whether the court of appeals correctly concluded that Higdon and Ludwig had no adequate remedy by appeal and were therefore entitled to mandamus relief. Although we have recognized that the standard’s “operative word, ‘adequate’, has no comprehensive definition” and demands a “careful balance of jurisprudential considerations that determine when appellate courts will use original mandamus proceedings to review the actions of lower courts,” mandamus will not issue when the law provides another plain, adequate, and complete remedy. In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 135‑36; see also Iley v. Hughes, 311 S.W.2d 648, 652 (Tex. 1958).

However, “[j]ustice demands a speedy resolution” in cases involving child custody. See Proffer v. Yates, 734 S.W.2d 671, 673 (Tex. 1987). In fact, we have acknowledged that appeal “is frequently inadequate to protect the rights of parents and children . . . .” Id. (granting mandamus relief for a trial court’s failure to transfer a custody dispute to the required venue). The Legislature enacted section 263.405, which provides an accelerated appeal that shortens deadlines, expedites filing of the appellate record, and requires the appellate court to “render its final order or judgment with the least possible delay,” to address this concern. Tex. Fam. Code § 263.405(a); see House Comm. On Juvenile Justice & Family Issues, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 2249, 77th Leg., R.S. (2001) (“House bill 2249 addresses post-judgment appellate delays . . . .”); see also Tex. Fam. Code § 263.405 (expediting appeals of final orders rendered under subchapter E “Final Order for Child under Department Care”); id. § 263.304 (authorizing parties to seek mandamus relief to compel a court to comply with certain duties). Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 28 provides other mechanisms for expediting appeals involving the termination of parental rights.

In this case, Higdon and Ludwig filed their motions to dismiss during trial. Because the trial was underway when the dismissal deadline passed and because physical possession of the children had already transferred to the Department when the petition for writ of mandamus was filed with the court of appeals, we conclude that an accelerated appeal provided an adequate remedy in this case. We do not hold that a party complaining of a trial court’s failure to dismiss a SAPCR within the statutory deadline could never be entitled to mandamus relief, but under the facts of this case, we cannot conclude that an accelerated appeal was not an adequate remedy. Impending transfer of physical possession of the children or a trial court’s unreasonable delay in entering a final decree might alter this conclusion, but this record raises neither concern. In fact, because the trial court entered the final decree on August 13, 2004, Ludwig and Higdon could have initiated an accelerated appeal under section 263.403 of the Texas Family Code at worst two days after they filed their petitions for writ of mandamus.

We recognize that in particular cases the statute could work injustice or encourage gamesmanship to push litigation beyond the deadline. We presume the Legislature recognized this also. But the Legislature also recognized that a statutory deadline would expedite the trial of these cases to help provide a modicum of certainty for children whose family situations are subject to the outcomes in these proceedings. It is not the Court’s task to choose between competing policies addressed by legislative drafting. See McIntyre, 109 S.W.3d at 748. We apply the mandates in the statute as written.

For these reasons, we conclude that the court of appeals erred in granting Ludwig’s and Higdon’s petitions for writ of mandamus. We conditionally grant the Department’s petition for writ of mandamus because Higdon and Ludwig had an adequate remedy by appeal. Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.8(c) and without hearing oral argument, we direct the court of appeals to vacate its order to the trial court directing the trial court to dismiss the case. The writ will issue only if the court of appeals does not comply.





________________________________________

J. Dale Wainwright

Justice





OPINION DELIVERED: December 15, 2006