Truancy and late to an execution or an education.....

........which one came first?

could he help his defense? EZ fall guy eh? I mean you would think an alleged "educational expert" would be on hand to speak up.

Yeah right!!!!!!!

What??????? why now?

Life was too long to wait to find out that in 1984 was the last year of innocence in public schools.......

or was it ever? Depends................If i skipped and had the balls to show up at the following class, you were called into the office.

Nowadays, at CCISD at least, no one cares, no one administrator gives a rats ass.

http://stxwatchdog.blogspot.com/

If 'A' has a positive right against 'B', then 'B' must assist 'A' to do 'x' if 'A' is not able to do 'x' without that assistance.

This is the tragic outcome, parents unable to fight the "delphi technique"

Heaven forbid the truth of Debbie Riddles of the world come out of their "Educated" tiny brain and learn.

What did she was taxpayers state funded "public education":::Significant legislation

In the Eightieth Texas Legislature, Representative Riddle authored House Bill 8, which was the Texas version of Jessica's Law. The bill was signed into law by Governor Rick Perry on June 15, 2007 and will become effective on September 1, 2007.

In the same session, she also authored House Bill 1034, which added the words "one state under God," to the Texas State Pledge. [1]

[edit] Pit of hell speech

In a March 6, 2003 interview with the El Paso Times, Riddle was quoted as saying:

"Where did this idea come from that everybody deserves free education, free medical care, free whatever? It comes from Moscow, from Russia. It comes straight out of the pit of hell. And it's cleverly disguised as having a tender heart. It's not a tender heart. It's ripping the heart out of this country." [1]

The quote came after a Border and International Affairs Committee meeting during the Seventy-eighth Texas Legislature, in which the state faced a budget deficit of $10 billion, [1] and was linked to a discussion Riddle had during the hearing regarding proposed health care cuts. The witness claimed that health care cuts would cause serious damage to border area hospitals, which Riddled countered with the claim that illegal immigrants were responsible for the financial strains. [1]

Riddle was further quoted as saying "In a perfect world, I think it would be wonderful to open our doors to any and all, young and old, for health care. But this isn't a perfect world. We have got to decide if we are going to just open our borders for any and all that come through for health care, education, and services." [1]

The comment was met almost instantly with both opposition and support from both ends of the political spectrum.

Texas Democrats claimed the statement was bigoted and "the product of an antipathy toward non-Anglo inhabitants of the state" and the Harris County Democratic Party called for her to resign from her position on the Border Affairs Committee[2]. The Mexican American Legislative Caucus was also quick to reprimand Riddle for her comments, informing her in a letter that "Our constitutional mandate comes not from the pit of hell. It comes from our state's forefathers." [3]

At the same time, the Unidas Hispanic Women's Club and the Republican National Hispanic Assembly of Harris County praised Riddle for the quote and honored her at a dinner at the conclusion of session. Reggie Gonzalez, chairman for the Republican Hispanic Outreach Committee of Harris County said in a press release: "The liberal opposition to Representative Riddle's comments offends me as a Hispanic citizen. Their opposition only strengthens this negative stereotype of Hispanic immigrants, by implying that they need a lower standard of accountability. This implication is detrimental to the cause of Mexican-Americans everywhere." [4]

Let us not forget::::::

"pit of hell" and prove the Scott Brister definition of "the ring of hell"

....The court of appeals (one justice dissenting) affirmed the summary judgment as to pre-termination conduct, holding Jackson’s affidavits described an “unpleasant and uncomfortable” workplace but not “the ring of hell” required to establish an intentional infliction claim.[5] But the court reversed and remanded for trial her infliction claim based on post-termination conduct.[6] Applying the usual standard of review,[7] we reverse for two of the reasons stated in the defendants’ motion.[8]

http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/Historical/2005/feb/021076.htm

Equality of Opportunity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 75, 51-68.

ISEC 2005

Inclusive and Supportive Education Congress
International Special Education Conference
Inclusion: Celebrating Diversity?

1st - 4th August 2005. Glasgow, Scotland
home
about the conference
programme
registration
accommodation
contact
Equality of Opportunity as a Rationale for Inclusive Education

Dr. Christian Liesen
Institute for Special Education – University of Zurich, Switzerland
Hirschengraben 48, CH-8001 Zurich
liesen@isp.unizh.ch


This paper seeks to discuss whether the principle of equality of opportunity could serve as a rationale for inclusive education. The first section aims at positioning the topic within the inclusive education discourse, narrowing down the scope. The second section presents a brief analysis of the notion of ‘equality of opportunity’ as well as some of its implications, while the third section addresses the question of how we are to know whether opportunities are equal. The last section seeks to draw some conclusions with respect to inclusive education. – It should be pointed out that the paper is solely meant for discussion.

1. The case for inclusive education: reasons and rationales

Many arguments have been brought forward to strengthen the case for inclusive education. Yet it is not always easy to follow the lines of reasoning, and little reflection is needed to notice certain contradictions and ambiguities and a good deal of eclecticism in the literature. The crux is, as Alan Dyson observed, that

(i)nclusion is different from many other fields of inquiry in that it is premised on an answer rather than a question. That ‘answer’, of course, is that inclusive education is superior in one or other way to non-inclusive education. The strength in this position is that it enables a relatively young field to define and advance itself in the face of considerable hostility. (…) The danger, however, is that it becomes all too easy for thinking on inclusion to descend from analysis to polemic, and for certain values and beliefs to become ossified, ultimately to the detriment of those marginalized groups on whose interests the inclusion movement claims to act. ( Dyson, 1999, p. 43f. )

Dyson has suggested to distinguish between two different but intersecting dimensions of the inclusive education movement: One is primarily concerned with providing a rationale for inclusion, whereas the other concentrates on the realisation of inclusion. Each dimension can again be subdivided into different discourses as follows. A rationale for inclusive education is either sought with reference to rights and social justice or by rigorously questioning the efficacy of special education (while claiming the superiority of inclusive education). The realisation of inclusion is frequently discussed either with respect to the political struggle for the implementation of inclusive education, or it is concerned with what inclusive education looks like inpractice (cf. Dyson, 1999, pp. 38-43 ). It is safe to say that these two dimensions / four discourses deliver a felicitous depiction of the inclusion debate’s crucial building blocks.

This paper is concerned with adumbrating the question whether equality of opportunity could serve as a rationale for inclusive education. It belongs, hence, in the context of the rights and social justice discourse. Concededly, the most important (and most interesting) question would actually be how the different building blocks interrelate, or ought to interact, in order to achieve progress in the field. Dyson does offer some very sensible and perspicacious suggestions on this (cf. ibid., pp. 44-48). The line of reasoning chosen here, by contrast, will allow only for a few rather cautious remarks in the final part of the paper. Proposed is the idea of merging, in a way, ethical considerations and empirical research in order to substantiate the case for inclusive education. As a consequence, some fundamental policy issues will emerge, alongside certain difficulties inherent to the rhetoric of inclusion.

2. Equality of opportunity

Let us shed, as a first step, some light on the principle of equality of opportunity. Peter Westen (1990) has presented an illuminating formal analysis. He states that opportunity

designates both a single concept and a multiplicity of conceptions. Each opportunity is like every other in that all opportunities reflect a certain formal relationship among agents, obstacles, and goals; but each opportunity also differs from other opportunities in that each is a relationship among particular agents, particular obstacles, and particular goals. ( Westen, 1990 , p. 171, italics added)

This may seem simple enough. Nevertheless, an important point with respect to the rhetoric of opportunity is already implied here: When opportunities are stated as a reason for, say, political action, speakers often do not specify the particular agents, obstacles, and/or goals they have in mind. Such a speech may still meet with approval although the underlying conceptions of speaker and listener may turn out to be radically different on closer examination. Rhetorical difficulties like these should be kept in mind.

Equal opportunities do not lead to equal outcomes. On the contrary, equal opportunities lead to inequality. There is sense in which a strong commitment to equality of opportunity is incompatible with equality of outcomes, and a society that aims at equalising opportunity is very different from a society that aims at equalising outcomes. The reason is that

(a)n ‘opportunity’ to attain a goal is a chance to attain a goal, not necessarily a guarantee of attaining it. Insofar as people have opportunities that are less than guarantees of what they wish, some of them will inevitably attain goals that others fail to attain. To create equal opportunity, therefore, is virtually always to allow people ‘to become unequal by competing against [their] fellows.’ (Westen, 1990, p. 176f.)

That equality of opportunity leads to inequality has some deeper implications. It can be argued that opportunities express and deliver a certain kind of liberty or freedom which is essential for society and which can not be achieved otherwise. Equality of opportunity is indispensable. T.D. Campbell enunciates the point as follows:

An opportunity may be said to occur when an agent is in a situation in which he may choose whether or not to perform some effortful act which is considered to be desirable in itself or as means to the attainment of some goal which is considered to be desirable. An opportunity is thus a type of liberty or freedom for it involves the absence of prohibitions or obstacles limiting what agents may or can do or acquire. […] (A)n opportunity is something which the agent may or may not take advantage of depending on whether or not he chooses to do so. One of the points about describing a situation as an opportunity is that this indicates that the outcome of the situation depends in part on the choices made by the person who has the opportunity. Opportunities can always be missed or passed up, neglected or rejected. Of course I may be forced to have an opportunity (as when I was compelled to go to school) but it is not an opportunity which I am forced to have if the attainment of the desired goal does not depend to some extent on my choices, that is, for instance, if whether or not I become educated as distinct from go to school, does not depend to some extent on my own volitions. If education as such could be compelled then we would not speak of educational opportunity, at least not in those cases where it is compelled. ( Campbell, 1975, p. 51/54, italics added )

It is true, of course, that not all opportunities are of particular concern to us. People do not care for all kinds of opportunities; they care first and foremost for educational and occupational opportunities. A ‘fair’ or ‘equal’ distribution of opportunities is relevant and vital especially in these domains. What comes into play here, then, is that equality of opportunity must be seen as a matter of distributive justice. A just society will usually seek to equalise opportunities in the sense of distributing them fair an equal. It is worth noticing, however, that opportunities can not be created or distributed at will. Westen notes that

creating one opportunity may mean denying another. Thus, whenever a society creates an opportunity by removing an obstacle that affects people differentially, it denies people the opportunity to benefit from the differential. And, whenever a society creates an opportunity by removing human obstacles, it denies people the opportunity to exploit those obstacles. This does not mean that societies should refrain from creating opportunities. It means, rather, that … the significant question for opportunity is not ‘Whether opportunity?’ but ‘Which opportunities?’ (Westen, 1990, p. 171)

Consequently and in most cases, with equality of opportunity as a rationale for inclusive education, apparently interests will have to be balanced. The interests of those who are excluded from participating effectively in society – of which the education system forms an essential part – will have to be weighed against the interests of those who are successful within such a framework and ‘benefit from the given differential’. A society will therefore have to deliberate about equalising opportunities, which is, ultimately, a democratic process (belonging to the realisation dimension).

It should be emphasized, however, that when a mismatch between a person’s situation and what may be called the dominant cooperative framework of society occurs, the results may be devastating. Being excluded from participating in the most basic interactions and cooperation of society strongly calls for compensation and adjustment. On this basic level, the interest in inclusion will by and large outweigh the interests of those who may be deprived of being as successful as they could be otherwise. If people are denied basic opportunities in this sense, they will normally be in the position of making strong claims in the cause of justice. But the question of particular interest is then, of course, ‘How do we know they are denied these opportunities?’, or more general, ‘How do we know whether opportunities are equal or not?’, e.g. in an education system.

3. How do we know when opportunities are equal?

We have seen so far that we should focus our attention on educational and occupational opportunities; that opportunities secure individual liberty and freedom and lead, consequently, to inequalities; and that equality of opportunity is a matter of distributive justice and may result in strong claims of justice in at least some cases. But on what grounds is it legitimate to judge whether opportunities are equal or not? How do we assess and evaluate equality of opportunity, especially with respect to inclusive education?

There is a substantive answer to this question. Any inquiry into whether opportunities in a given society are equal or not – or within parts of a society, such as the education system – will have to start from ascertainable inequalities under the prevailing circumstances. These inequalities will have to be sufficiently and adequately described in a way that most people would agree is accurate. (We will look at an example in a moment.)

The crucial point to be addressed will be whether or not the portrayed inequalities indicate that the principle of equality of opportunity has been violated. Onora O’Neill (1977) has argued that two different positions suggest themselves. One may be called the ‘formal’ (or ‘liberal’) position. It stresses that inequalities are due to the fact that people may choose to or refrain from taking advantage of the opportunities at hand. The members of society may be extremely unequal in educational and occupational attainment, but if so, it must be the result of the varying capacities, volitions, and desires of those to whom the respective selection procedures are applied. Once the distributive and selective procedures are fair, there is nothing left to complain about. As O’Neill points out,

(s)uch an ‘equal-opportunity society’ would … not be characterized by equal incomes or equal property holdings or equal standards of living or of education. (…) Equal opportunity in the formal sense does not ensure equal success or equal health or equal status, but only the fair application of the rules governing the pursuit of such goods. This is the equality of opportunity of … a society in which there are winners and losers, and in which winning appears often as merited by the winners and losing as deserved by the losers – for did they not all have equal opportunity to win? ( O'Neill, 1977 , p. 180)

The other position may be called the ‘substantive’ (or ‘egalitarian’) position. It stresses that inequalities must not indicate a disproportionate success of certain social groups in a society. Instead, all major social groups – but not all individuals – must fare equally well.

An equal-opportunity society on the substantive view is one in which the success rates of all major social groups are the same. (…) A strong commitment to substantive equality of opportunity demands that any under-representation of some group in some line of employment / income group / educational group be due solely to the unmanipulated choice of members of that group. (…) Substantively equal opportunity is achieved when the success rates of certain major social groups – such as the two sexes, various ethnic groups and perhaps various age groups – are equalized. It is not breached when there are large differences between the most- and least-successful members of these groups, provided that there are equally large differences between the most- and least-successful members of other major social groups. It is not true in a society which aims at substantively equal opportunities that all individuals have the same chance of any given type of success. For individuals are all members of many differently defined groups, and substantive equality of opportunity seeks only to equalize their chances qua members of certain major social groups; it seeks to eliminate inter-group differences, but not to alter intra-group ones. ( O'Neill, 1977 , p. 181-83)

This position is ready to acknowledge that people’s perspectives in life are not exclusively ascribable to a person’s capacities, volitions, and desires. As a matter of fact, there are disadvantages which are undeserved and beyond individual control, such as being disabled or of old age. The ‘substantive’ position is concerned with identifying adequate characteristics of major social groups to enable sound comparisons and call for compensation where needed.

To illustrate, a good example are some results from the PISA study (cf. www.pisa.oecd.org). The OECD Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) is an internationally standardised assessment that was jointly developed by the participating countries (30 OECD member states plus 13 associated countries in the first assessment in 2000; at least 58 countries will participate in the next assessment in 2006). PISA claims to assess “how far students near the end of compulsory education have acquired some of the knowledge and skills that are essential for full participation in society.” The idea is to give information about the capacities and the potential of education systems. Does an education system prepare students well?

It is only recently that OECD has published some findings concerning equity and quality in the light of the PISA 2000 results. The report states that

(i)n sum, PISA 2000 results show that students in integrated education systems perform, on average, better than those in selective education systems, and that their educational performance is less dependent on their background. Many factors may be at play here. A higher average performance suggests that the more heterogeneous student groups or classes in integrated education systems could have a beneficial effect for the lower-performing students. Also, the flexibility offered by an integrated system may allow students to improve their performance while keeping their academic options open. ( OECD, 2005 , p. 89)

In the main findings section, the report reads:

A striking result was the advantage that comprehensive education systems appear to have in terms of student performance (quality). PISA 2000 results suggest that the performance of students enrolled in comprehensive education systems is less dependent on their socio-economic background. ( ibid., p. 94)

From the perspective of equality of opportunity, it is not so much the aspect of performance (‘quality’) that is of interest here but rather the aspect of uncoupling socio-economic background and performance (‘equity’). There are some countries – Germany is a sad example – in which the social background of a student has a very strong impact (‘predictive power’) on student performance. This means, to put the matter bluntly, that it is not a student’s capacity to perform that determines what he or she will achieve, but first and foremost his or her socio-economic background. The result is that students with a low social background are manifestly underrepresented on the higher levels of the education system.

The ‘liberal’ position has no option but to ascribe this situation to individual factors, say, motivation or ability. This is highly implausible, at least in the case of countries that have had to experience a rude awakening by PISA, such as Germany or Switzerland. ‘Substantive’ equality of opportunity, on the other hand, is precisely concerned with cases like these: Members of a major social group – i.e., students with a lower socio-economic background – are disadvantaged due to factors that are undeserved and beyond individual control, while other groups display disproportionate success. This does call for an equalisation of opportunities.



4. Equality of opportunity and inclusive education: some considerations

In the final part of this paper, I would like to draw some conclusions concerning equality of opportunity and inclusive education.

First, I think that equality of opportunity can serve as a rationale for inclusive education if and only if inclusion is understood in the sense of equity. This would mean to adopt the substantive view of equal opportunity, and will require to provide empirical evidence to show that a major social group of society is indeed undeservedly disadvantaged. It would also mean to suggest that some form of inclusive education is the right course of action to take.

Second, to provide a rationale for inclusive education is obviously very different from the realisation of inclusive education. It should be kept in mind that other interests will have to be allowed for as well and that there might be considerable opposition, even if the claims could compellingly be shown to be legitimate ones. This should not belie the fact, however, that being in the position to provide a rationale for inclusive education is very different from simply claiming that it is right. It is precisely because different and mutually incompatible interests are involved that arguments have to be provided (and there are some highly interesting contributions in this kind of spirit, for example Booth & Ainscow, 1998; Pijl, Meijer & Hegarty, 1997; Vitello & Mithaug, 1998 ).

Third, if this idea bears any validity at all, it has to be pointed out that the rhetoric of inclusion tends to disguise some fundamental points here, especially in relation to policy. For example, the rhetoric of ‘celebrating diversity’ tends to downplay the fact that different legitimate interests are involved and have to be balanced. Cause for concern gives also the factor that any policy perspective will always have to operate along the lines of defining social groups. It may come as a surprise that this is not only due to administrative reasons (cf. Dever, 1990 ) but is also demanded from an ethically informed perspective. There are no claims of distributive justice – and hence no rationale for inclusive education – without the construction of social groups. The talk of heterogeneity isn’t much help in these matters, the more so as it quite often blurs who is thought to be the target group of inclusion within the inclusive education discourse.

Fourth, it will be as unavoidable as it is fruitful to strive to merge ethical considerations and empirical research in some respect. The idea behind this is that an empirical basis is indispensable in order to substantiate claims, while at the same time ethical considerations are indispensable to provide a sensible interpretative framework for empirical findings and to draw sound conclusions. One main feature of these arguments, reasons and rationales is that they must be eligible to convince others on grounds they can not reasonably reject – to convincingly argue the case.

Fifth, there seems to be a broad consensus that inclusive education has to be conceptualised as a general education topic, not as another issue of special education. Equality of opportunity might help us to engross the implications of what this actually means. It might help us to see the big picture.

Sixth, it has to be pointed out that there is not one choice in these matters, but many. There is no unequivocal course of action to take. Dyson’s proposal to talk not of inclusion, but of inclusions, and to seek not a single form but a wide range of inclusive practice and organisation (1999, p. 46), deserves a good deal more of attention. Moreover, I think the field of special education should be very serious about Seamus Hegarty’s remark that inclusive education has to be about changing and modifying system in a way that preserves all its strengths (cf. Hegarty, 1998 , p. 156).

References

BOOTH T. & AINSCOW M. (eds.) (1998) From Them to Us. An International Study of Inclusion in Education. London: Routledge.

CAMPBELL T.D. (1975) Equality of Opportunity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 75, 51-68.

DEVER R.B. (1990) Defining Mental Retardation from an Instructional Perspective. Mental Retardation 28 (3), 147-53.

DYSON A. (1999) Inclusion and Inclusions: Theories and Discourses in Inclusive Education. IN Daniels H. & Garner P. (eds.) World Yearbook of Education 1999: Inclusive Education. London: Kogan, 36-53.

HEGARTY S. (1998) Challenges to Inclusive Education: A European Perspective. IN Vitello S. & Mithaug D.E. (eds.) Inclusive Schooling: National and International Perspectives. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 151-65.

O'NEILL O. (1977) How Do We Know When Opportunities Are Equal? IN Vetterling-Braggin M., Elliston F.A. & English J. (eds.) Feminism and Philosophy. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 177-89.

OECD (2005) School Factors Related to Quality and Equity. Results from Pisa 2000. Paris: OECD.

PIJL S.J., MEIJER C. & HEGARTY S. (eds.) (1997) Inclusive Education: A Global Agenda. London: Routledge.

VITELLO S. & MITHAUG D.E. (eds.) (1998) Inclusive Schooling. National and International Perspectives. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

WESTEN P. (1990) Speaking of Equality. An Analysis of the Rhetorical Force of Equality in Moral and Legal Discourse. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

home . about the conference . programme . registration . accommodation . contact
The University of Strathclyde Association of Directors of Education in Scotland NASEN Inclusive Technology Ltd Greater Glasgow & Clyde Valley Tourist Board Virtual Staff College

Why are schools not provides specifically that truancy is conduct indicating a need for supervision, but at school there is no supervision. Why not?

Home
About TJPC
Legal & Legislative
Publications
Services
Statistics
Training & Events
Search
Texas Juvenile Probation Commission Header

Click here to skip to text only menus
Error to adjudicate child delinquent for truancy

On October 20, 1999, the Dallas Court of Appeal reversed an adjudication for delinquent conduct when the judgment recited that it was based on conduct constituting truancy. Truancy is CINS, not delinquent conduct.

99-4-18. In the Matter of A.S., UNPUBLISHED, No. 05-98-02086, 1999 WL 956308, 1999 Tex.App.Lexis ___ (Tex.App.--Dallas 10/20/99)[Texas Juvenile Law 49 (4th Ed. 1996)].

Facts: The juvenile court adjudicated A.S. a child engaged in delinquent [sic] on a finding of truancy and committed him to the Texas Youth Commission (TYC). In two points of error, A.S. contends the juvenile court erred in its adjudication, in failing to state specific reasons for disposition, and that the evidence is insufficient to support the disposition. We sustain A.S.'s first point of error and reverse and render judgment.



A petition alleged appellant engaged in delinquent conduct by violating a lawful justice court order "under circumstances that would constitute contempt" by failing to "attend school each and every day with no unexcused absences ... in violation of Section 51.03 of the Texas Family Code." The juvenile court informed A.S. that, if the petition was found to be true, the court could place A.S. on probation at home in the custody of a parent or outside the home until his eighteenth birthday or A.S. could be committed to TYC until his twenty-first birthday. A.S. pleaded true, and the court found him to be a child engaged in delinquent conduct. In its adjudication findings, the juvenile court found A.S. committed the offense of "failing to attend school each and every school day with no unexcused absences and by failing to attend each and every class of each day of school[ ] on 12-1-97" and declared A.S. a child engaged in delinquent conduct, as defined by section 51.03 of the family code. After hearing evidence regarding disposition at the initial and subsequent hearings, the juvenile court committed A.S. to TYC.



The juvenile court entered the following findings for purposes of disposition:



1. The child is in need of rehabilitation;

2. The public is in need of protection;

3. The respondent child's best interest will be served by being placed outside the home[;]

4. All reasonable efforts were made to prevent or eliminate the need for the child's removal from the home and to make it possible for the child to return to the home[;]

5. The child, in the child's home, cannot be provided the quality of care and level of support and supervision that the child needs to meet the conditions of probation.



The juvenile court then committed A.S. to TYC "for the reasons stated above."



Held: Reversed and rendered.



Opinion Text: In his first point of error, A.S. contends the trial court erred in adjudicating him a child engaged in delinquent conduct. We view the evidence as a whole to determine whether the State met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 54.03(f) (Vernon 1996); C.D.F. v. State, 852 S.W.2d 281, 284 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1993, no writ); In re S.D.W., 811 S.W.2d 739, 749 (Tex.App.-Houston [1 st Dist.] 1991, no writ).



Failure to attend school is a misdemeanor offense under the education code and may be prosecuted in a justice court. See Tex. Educ.Code Ann. § 25.094(b) & (f) (Vernon 1996 & Supp.1999). If the justice court finds a juvenile "has engaged in truant conduct and that the conduct is of a recurrent nature," the court may order the juvenile to "attend school without unexcused absences." Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 54.021(d)(6) (Vernon Supp.1999). If the justice court finds a juvenile has violated its order, the court shall transfer the complaint to the juvenile court which shall conduct a de novo adjudication hearing under section 54.03 of the family code. See Tex. Educ.Code Ann. § 25.094(d) (Vernon 1996). Under section 54.03 of the family code, a juvenile court may find that a juvenile has engaged in delinquent conduct or conduct indicating a need for supervision. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 54.03 (Vernon 1996). The code also provides specifically that truancy is conduct indicating a need for supervision, not delinquent conduct. See id. § 51.03(a)(2)(B) & (b)(2) (Vernon Supp.1999); In the Matter of J.B.S., 696 S.W.2d 223, 225 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ); In the Matter of A.L.H., 517 S.W.2d 652, 653 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [1 st Dist.] 1974, no writ). A juvenile adjudicated a truant under section 51.03 of the family code may not be committed to TYC. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 51.02(15)(A) (Vernon Supp.1999), § 54.04(o) (Vernon 1996) (providing that a child who commits truancy under section 51.03(b)(2), which is conduct that cannot be committed by an adult, may not be committed to TYC).



The juvenile court found A.S. committed the offense of failing to attend school with no unexcused absences, that is, truancy, which is not delinquent conduct under section 51.03 of the family code. Thus, there is no evidence to support an adjudication that A.S. is a child engaged in delinquent conduct. The State argues the court's error is a clerical rather than a legal error because the record demonstrates that A.S. pleaded to a charge of contempt that would support the adjudication. The State proposes that we may either correct the error in the factual finding or remand to the trial court for correction by a nunc pro tunc judgment. See, e.g., State v. Bates, 889 S.W.2d 306, 309 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) (noting "nunc pro tunc orders may be used only to correct clerical errors in which no judicial reasoning contributed to their entry, and for some reason were not entered of record at the proper time"); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1991, pet. ref'd) (noting "[a]ppellate courts have the power to reform whatever the trial court could have corrected by a judgment nunc pro tunc where the evidence necessary to correct the judgment appears in the record"); Tex.R.App. P. 43.2(b). However, the written judgment's finding that A.S. "failed to attend school" is consistent with the record of the plea. Furthermore, at a later disposition hearing, the court stated, "Back on September 22 nd, 1998, [A.S.] plead (sic) true to a count of truancy...." This finding of truancy was a judicial determination. Thus, we conclude the juvenile court's holding that A.S. engaged in delinquent conduct was error. We sustain A.S.'s first point of error. Our disposition of the first point of error makes it unnecessary for us to address A.S.'s second point of error. See Tex.R.App. P. 47.1.



We reverse the juvenile court's "Order of Adjudication and Judgment of Disposition with T.Y.C. Commitment" in all respects and render judgment that A.S. is not a child engaged in delinquent conduct.



Graphic: Star for Texas Flag Banner

[Home] [About TJPC] [Legal & Legislative] [Publications] [Services] [Statistics] [Training & Events] [Search]
Please visit these sites:
Graphic: Link to Texas Online Graphic: Link to TRAIL (Texas Records and Information Locator Service)
Graphic: Link to Texas Homeland Security

Disclaimer / Privacy Policy / Compact with Texans
Want to send questions or comments? Click here for contact information.
Last modified: September 07, 2007 01:51 PM

Corpus Christi 's students would do well (need)to learn and know this information..........

TEXAS JUVENILE LAW

In Texas, juveniles are defined as minors, older than 10 years of age and under the age of 17. Juveniles are treated differently than adult offenders and the general goal of the juvenile system is rehabilitation as opposed to punishment. However, the penalties in the juvenile system can still be severe. Some offenses, such as truancy and breaking curfew, are unique to juveniles, and would not be illegal if the accused were an adult. The juvenile justice system generally moves much more quickly than does the adult criminal justice system. Don't wait to hire a good juvenile defense lawyer to represent your child. Call Attorney David Finn at: 214-651-1121.

There are separate courts and rules that govern the juvenile process. The juvenile court system will generally make every effort to rehabilitate the child rather than simply incarcerate him. Only in extreme cases, such as serious felonies, usually involving allegations of violence or the use of a deadly weapon, will a juvenile be tried as an adult. The juvenile courts may hold a hearing to determine whether to transfer the juvenile to the adult court system. This is called a "transfer hearing." The court will base its decision to transfer on the following factors:

1. The seriousness of the offense
2. The child's criminal sophistication
3. Previous criminal record
4. Previous attempts to rehabilitate the juvenile offender
5. The court's belief that future attempts at rehabilitation will be unsuccessful

While many of the laws governing juveniles may differ from the adult system, the rights that juveniles enjoy are virtually identical to those enjoyed by adults.

1. A juvenile must be read his Miranda rights if placed under arrest.
2. A juvenile has the right to have an attorney present during interrogation.
3. A juvenile has the right to know the specific charges being brought by the State.
4. A juvenile has rights against self-incrimination.
5. A juvenile has the right to confront his accuser and examine witnesses.
6. A juvenile has the right to appeal the court's decision.
7. A juvenile does have the right to a jury trial during the adjudication phase

If a juvenile finds herself in a situation involving the police or other law enforcement, please remember the following information:

1. You do not have to submit to a search unless you have been placed under arrest.

If you are asked to give permission to search you should politely but firmly decline. If the police say they have a search warrant, ask to see it.

2. Do not resist arrest.
3. Do not volunteer information or answer questions without your attorney present.
4. Provide only your name, address, and phone number.
5. Call your parents as soon as possible.
6. Insist that your parents and an attorney be present during questioning.
7. Do not discuss your case with anyone other than your attorney.

Do not discuss your case with your friends or classmates.

Finally, do not attempt to represent yourself in court. Hire an experienced criminal defense attorney, preferably one who is board-certified in criminal law.

Texas Juvenile Justice: Overview

Taking Into Custody; Issuance of Warning Notice: Texas Family Code Section 52.01

A child may be taken into custody: pursuant to an order of the juvenile court; pursuant to the Texas laws for arrest; by a law enforcement officer if there is probable cause to believe that the child has engaged in conduct that violates the penal laws of Texas or any political subdivision or delinquent conduct or conduct indicating a need for supervision. It is the duty of the law enforcement officer who has taken a child into custody to transport the child to the appropriate detention facility if the child is not released to the parent, guardian, or custodian of the child. If the juvenile detention facility is located outside the county in which the child is taken into custody, it shall be the duty of the law enforcement officer who has taken the child into custody or, if authorized by the commissioners court of the county, the sheriff of that county, to transport the child to the appropriate juvenile detention facility unless the child is released to the parent, guardian, or custodian of the child.

Delinquent Conduct: Conduct Indicating a Need for Supervision:

Texas Family Code Section 51.03

(a) Delinquent conduct is defined as:

1. conduct, other than a traffic offense, that violates a penal law of Texas or of the United States punishable by imprisonment or by confinement in jail;
2. conduct that violates a lawful order of a municipal court or justice court under circumstances that would constitute contempt of that court;
3. conduct that constitutes: Driving While Intoxicated (DWI), Flying While Intoxicated, Boating While Intoxicated, Intoxication Assault, Intoxication Manslaughter, and Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol by a minor (DUI).

(b) Conduct indicating a need for supervision includes:

1. conduct, other than a traffic offense, that violates the penal laws of Texas of the grade of misdemeanor that are punishable by a fine only (class c-misdemeanors); the penal ordinances of any political subdivision of Texas; the absence of a child on 10 or more days or parts of days within a 6 month period in the same school year or on 3 or more days or parts of days within a 4 week period from school; the voluntary absence of a child from the child's home without the consent of the child's parents or guardian for a substantial length of time or without intent to return; conduct prohibited by city ordinance or by state law involving the inhalation of the fumes or vapors of paint; or an act that violates a school district's previously communicated written standards of student conduct for which the child has been expelled under Section 37.007(c), Texas Education Code.

Release from Detention: Texas Family Code Section 53.02

(a) If a child is brought before the court or delivered to a detention facility, the intake or other authorized officer of the court shall immediately make an investigation and shall release the child unless it appears that his detention is warranted under subsection (b), below.

The release may be conditioned upon requirements reasonably necessary to insure the child's appearance at later proceedings, but the conditions of the release must be in writing and filed with the office or official designated by the court and a copy furnished to the child.

(b) A child taken into custody may be detained prior to hearing on the petition only if:

1. the child is likely to abscond or be removed from the court's jurisdiction;
2. suitable supervision, care, or protection for the child is not being provided by a parent, guardian, custodian, or other person;
3. the child has no parent, guardian, custodian, or other person able to return the child to the court when required;
4. the child may be dangerous to himself or herself or the child may threaten the safety of the public if released;
5. the child has previously been found to be a delinquent child or has previously been convicted of a penal offense punishable by a term in jail or prison and is likely to commit an offense if released; or
6. the child's detention is required under subsection (f), below.

(c) If the child is not released, a request for detention hearing shall be made and promptly presented to the court, and an informal detention hearing shall be held promptly, but not later than the second working day after the child is taken into custody. If the child is taken into custody on a Friday or Saturday, then the detention hearing shall be held on the first working day after the child is taken into custody.

(d) A release of a child to an adult must be conditioned on the agreement of the adult to be subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and to an order of contempt by the court if the adult, after notification, is unable to produce the child at later proceedings.

(e) If a child being released under this section is expelled from school in a county with a population greater than 125,000, the release shall be conditioned on the child's attending a juvenile justice alternative education program pending a deferred prosecution or formal court disposition of the child's case.

(f) A child who is alleged to have engaged in delinquent conduct and to have used, possessed, or exhibited a firearm in the commission of the offense shall be detained until the child is released at the direction of the judge of the juvenile court, a substitute judge, or a referee appointed, including an oral direction by telephone, or until a detention hearing is held.

Detention Hearing: Texas Family Code Section 54.01

(a) Generally speaking, a detention hearing without a jury shall be held promptly, but not later than the second working day after the child is taken into custody; provided, however, that when a child is detained on a Friday or Saturday, then such detention hearing shall be held on the first working day after the child is taken into custody.

(b) Reasonable notice of the detention hearing, either oral or written, shall be given, stating the time, place, and purpose of the hearing. Notice shall be given to the child and, if they can be found, to his parents, guardian, or custodian. Prior to the beginning of the hearing, the court shall inform the parties of the child's right to counsel and to appointed counsel if they are indigent and of the child's right to remain silent with respect to any allegations of delinquent conduct or conduct indicating a need for supervision.

(c) At the detention hearing, the court may consider written reports from probation officers, professional court employees, or by professional consultants in addition to the testimony of witnesses. Prior to the detention hearing, the court shall provide the attorney for the child with access to all written matter to be considered by the court in making the detention decision. The court may order counsel not to reveal items to the child or his parents if such disclosure would materially harm the treatment and rehabilitation of the child or would substantially decrease the likelihood of receiving information from the same or similar sources in the future.

(d) A detention hearing may be held without the presence of the child's parents if the court has been unable to locate them. If no parent or guardian is present, the court shall appoint counsel or a guardian ad litem for the child.

(e) At the conclusion of the hearing the court shall order the child released from detention unless it appears that he is likely to abscond, suitable supervision is not being provided to the child, he has no parent or guardian able to return the child to court when required, he may be dangerous to himself or others, or he has previously been found to be a delinquent child or has been previously convicted of a penal offense higher than a Class C misdemeanor and is likely to commit an offense if released. If the judge concludes that the child should be detained, the detention order extends for no more than 10 working days. Further detention orders may be made following subsequent detention hearings. The initial detention hearing may not be waived, but subsequent detention hearing may be waived.

Note: No statement made by the child at the detention hearing shall be admissible against the child at any other hearing.

Preliminary Investigation & Determinations; Notice to Parents:

Texas Family Code Section 53.01

On referral of a child, the intake officer, probation officer, or other person authorized by the court shall conduct a preliminary investigation to determine whether the person referred is a child and whether there is probable cause to believe that the child engaged in delinquent conduct or conduct indicating a need for supervision. If it is determined that the person is not a child or there is no probable cause, the person shall immediately be released. The child's parents are to promptly receive notice of the whereabouts of the child and also a statement explaining why the child was taken into custody. If the child is alleged to have engaged in delinquent conduct of the grade of felony, or conduct constituting a misdemeanor offense involving violence to a person or the use or possession of a firearm, illegal knife, or club, then the case is immediately forwarded to the office of the prosecuting attorney.

Summons: Texas Family Code Section 53.06

The juvenile court shall direct issuance of a summons to the child named in the petition, the child's parents, guardian, or custodian, the child's guardian ad litem, and any other person who appears to the court to be a proper or necessary party to the proceeding. A party, other than the child, may waive service of summons by written stipulation or by voluntary appearance at the hearing.

Service of Summons: Texas Family Code Section 53.07

If a person to be served with a summons is in Texas and can be found, the summons shall be served upon him personally at least 2 days before the adjudication hearing. If he is in Texas but cannot be found, but his address is known or can be ascertained, the summons may be served on him by mailing a copy by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, at least 5 days before the day of the hearing. If he is outside Texas but can be found or his address is known, service of the summons may be made either by delivering a copy to him personally or mailing a copy to him by registered mail, return receipt requested, at least 5 days before the day of the adjudication hearing.

Attendance at Hearing: Parent or Other Guardian: Texas Family Code Section 51.115

Parents or guardians of a child are required by law to attend each court hearing affecting a child held under: possible transfer to criminal district/adult court; adjudication hearing; disposition hearing; hearing to modify disposition; release or transfer hearing. If a parent or guardian receives notice of any of these proceedings and is a resident of Texas, failure to appear could result in a fine for contempt of court.

Photographs & Fingerprints of Children: Texas Family Code Sections 58.002-0021

With limited exceptions, a child may not be photographed or fingerprinted without the consent of the juvenile court unless the child is taken into custody or referred to the juvenile court for conduct that constitutes a felony or a misdemeanor punishable by confinement in jail (which means a Class A or Class B misdemeanor). However, this prohibition does not prohibit law enforcement from photographing or fingerprinting a child who is not in custody if the child's parent or guardian voluntarily consents in writing. Furthermore, this prohibition does not apply to fingerprints that are required or authorized to be submitted or obtained for an application for a driver's license or personal identification card.

Note/Exception to General Rule stated above: Law enforcement may take temporary custody of a child to take the child's fingerprints if the officer: has probable cause to believe that the child has engaged in delinquent conduct; the officer has investigated that conduct and found other fingerprints during the investigation; and the officer has probable cause to believe that the child's fingerprints will match the other fingerprints. Law enforcement may take temporary custody of a child to take the child's photograph if the officer: has probable cause to believe that the child has engaged in delinquent conduct; and the officer has probable cause to believe that the child's photograph will be of material assistance in the investigation of the conduct. However, in either instance, unless the child then placed under arrest, the child must be released from temporary custody as soon as the fingerprints or photographs are obtained.

Waiver of Rights: Texas Family Code Section 51.09

Unless a contrary intent clearly appears elsewhere in the Family Code, any right granted to a child by this Section or by the constitution or laws of Texas or the United States may be waived in proceedings under this section if:

1. the waiver is made by the child and the attorney for the child;
2. the child and the attorney waiving the right are informed of and understand the right and the possible consequences of waiving it;
3. the waiver is voluntary; and
4. the waiver is made in writing or in court proceedings that are recorded.

Polygraph Examination: Texas Family Code Section 51.151

If a child is taken into custody pursuant to an order of the juvenile court or pursuant to the laws of arrest by a law enforcement officer, a person may not administer a polygraph examination to the child without the consent of the child's attorney or the juvenile court unless the child is transferred to a criminal district court for prosecution in the adult system. Bottom line: Do not consent to a polygraph examination without consulting with your lawyer.

Physical or Mental Examination: Texas Family Code Section 51.20

(a) At any stage of the proceedings the juvenile court may order a child who is referred to the juvenile court or who is alleged by a petition or found to have engaged in delinquent conduct or conduct indicating a need for supervision to be examined by the local mental health or mental retardation authority or another appropriate expert, including a physician, psychiatrist, or psychologist.

(b) If, after conducting an examination of a child and reviewing any other relevant information, there is reason to believe that the child has a mental illness or mental retardation, the probation department shall refer the child to the local mental health or mental retardation authority for evaluation and services, unless the prosecutor has filed a court petition against the child alleging delinquent conduct or conduct indicating a need for supervision.

Election Between Juvenile Court & Alternate Juvenile Court:

Texas Family Code Section 51.18

(a) This section applies only to a child who has a right to a trial before a juvenile court the judge of which is not an attorney licensed to practice in Texas.

(b) On any matter that may lead to an order appealable under Section 56.01 of the Family Code, a child may be tried before either the juvenile court or the alternate juvenile court.

(c) The child may elect to be tried before the alternate juvenile court only if the child files a written notice with that court not later than 10 days before the date of the trial. After the notice is filed, the child may be tried only in the alternate juvenile court. If the child does not file a notice as provided by this section, the child may be tried only in the juvenile court.

(d) If the child is tried before the juvenile court, the child is not entitled to a trial de novo before the alternate juvenile court.

Transfer/Waiver: Texas Family Code Section 54.02

The juvenile court may waive its exclusive original jurisdiction and transfer a child to the appropriate criminal district court to be tried as an adult if the child is alleged to have violated a penal law of the grade of felony if the child was 14 years of age or older at the time he is alleged to have committed the offense, if the offense is a capital felony, an aggravated controlled substance felony, or a felony of the first degree; or 15 years of age or older at the time the child is alleged to have committed the offense, if the offense is a felony of the second or third degree or a state jail felony.

The juvenile court judge is not required to certify a child to stand trial as an adult. It's a judgment call. The juvenile court judge will investigate the matter and hold a hearing on the transfer request. The judge orders a complete diagnostic study, social evaluation, and a full investigation of the child, his circumstances, and the circumstances of the alleged offense. At the transfer hearing the court may consider written reports from probation officers, professional court employees, or professional consultants in addition to the testimony of witnesses. In making her decision whether to transfer the case to the adult court, the judge considers: (1) whether the alleged offense was against person or property, with greater weight in favor of transfer given to offenses against a person; (2) the sophistication and maturity of the child; (3) the record and previous history of the child; and (4) the prospects of adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of the rehabilitation of the child by use or procedures, services, and facilities currently available to the juvenile court.

Determinate Sentencing: Texas Family Code Section 53.045

If a child is accused of a very serious criminal violation, or habitual felony conduct (see section below), the prosecutor can pursue what is called determinate sentencing. In order to pursue determinate sentencing the prosecutor files a petition with the grand jury, basically asking the grand jury to grant the prosecutor's request to pursue determinate sentencing if the child is convicted. If 9 members of the grand jury approve the petition, then determinate sentencing becomes a viable sentencing option for the judge/jury if the child is convicted of the offense. Determinate sentencing doesn't mean that the child will be tried as an adult in a criminal district court. The case remains in the juvenile court even if the grand jury grants the request for determinate sentencing. but the stakes for the child are raised dramatically if the grand jury grants the prosecutor's petition for determinate sentencing.

Eligibility: The prosecutor can pursue determinate sentencing if the child is charged with habitual felony conduct, or if the child is charged with any of the following offenses:

capital murder, murder, manslaughter, aggravated kidnapping, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, aggravated assault, aggravated robbery, injury to a child, elderly, or disabled individual if punishable as a felony other than a state jail felony, felony deadly conduct involving the discharge of a firearm, aggravated controlled substance felony, criminal solicitation of a minor, indecency with a child, arson, if bodily injury or death is suffered by any person by reason of the commission of the arson, intoxication manslaughter, or attempted murder or attempted capital murder. If your child is charged with one of the offenses listed above, she is eligible for determinate sentencing even if this is her first offense.

Impact: If the grand jury grants the prosecutor's request to impose determinate sentencing, and the child is convicted of habitual felony conduct or any of the offenses listed above, then the court or jury may sentence the child to commitment in the Texas Youth Commission with a possible transfer to the institutional division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (adult prison system) for a term of: up to 40 years if the conduct constitutes a capital felony, first-degree felony, or an aggravated controlled substance felony; up to 20 years if the conduct constitutes a second-degree felony; and up to 10 years if the conduct constitutes a third-degree felony. So instead of being sent to the Texas Youth Commission until the child turns 18, determinate sentencing would allow the child to be sentenced to up to 40 years in the adult prison system by a judge or jury.

Habitual Felony Conduct: Texas Family Code Section 51.031

(a) Habitual felony conduct is conduct violating a penal law of the grade of felony, other than a state jail felony, if:

1. the child who engaged in the conduct has at least 2 previous final adjudications as having engaged in delinquent conduct violating a penal law of the grade of felony; and,
2. the second previous final adjudication is for conduct that occurred after the date the first previous adjudication became final; and,
3. all appeals relating to the previous adjudications have been exhausted.

Review by Prosecutor: Texas Family Code Section 53.012

The prosecuting attorney shall promptly review the circumstances and allegations of a referral made to her for legal sufficiency and the desirability of prosecution and may file a petition without regard to whether probable cause was found during the court's preliminary investigation.

If the prosecutor does not file a petition requesting the adjudication of the child referred to the prosecutor, the prosecutor must terminate all proceedings, if the reason is for the lack of probable cause; or return the referral to the juvenile probation department for further proceedings.

The prosecutors have considerable discretion and control over your child's case.

Deferred Prosecution: Texas Family Code Section 53.03

(a) Subject to subsections (e) and (g) below, if the preliminary investigation results in a determination that further proceedings in the case are authorized, the probation officer or other designated officer of the court, subject to the direction of the juvenile court, may advise the parties for a reasonable period of time not to exceed 6 months concerning deferred prosecution and rehabilitation of a child if:

1. deferred prosecution would be in the best interest of the public and child;
2. the child and her parent, guardian, or custodian consent with knowledge that consent is not obligatory; and
3. the child and his parent, guardian, or custodian are informed that they may terminate the deferred prosecution at any point and petition the court for a court hearing in the case.

(b) Except as otherwise permitted, the child may not be detained during or as a result of the deferred prosecution process.

(c) An incriminating statement made by a participant to the person giving advice and in the discussion or conferences incident thereto may not be used against the declarant in any court hearing.

(d) The court may adopt a fee schedule for deferred prosecution services. The maximum fee is $15 per month.

(e) The prosecuting attorney may defer prosecution for any child. A probation officer or other designated officer of the court may defer prosecution for a child who has previously been adjudicated for conduct that constitutes a felony only if the prosecuting attorney consents in writing.

(f) The probation officer or other officer supervising a program of deferred prosecution for a child shall report to the juvenile court any violation by the child of the program.

(g) Prosecution may not be deferred for a child alleged to have engaged in conduct that constitutes: driving/flying/boating while intoxicated, intoxication assault, intoxication manslaughter, or that constitutes a third or subsequent offense of consumption of alcohol by a minor or driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) of a minor.

First Offender Program: Texas Family Code Section 52.031

A juvenile board may establish a first offender program for the referral and disposition of children taken into custody for: (1) conduct indicating a need for supervision; or (2) delinquent conduct other than conduct that constitutes a felony of the first, second, or third degree, an aggravated controlled substance felony, or a capital felony; or a state jail felony or misdemeanor involving violence to a person or the use or possession of a firearm, illegal knife, or club, or a prohibited weapon, as described by Section 46.05, Texas Penal Code. If the child has previously been adjudicated as having engaged in delinquent conduct he may be ineligible for the First Offender Program. Also, the child's parents or guardian must receive notice that the child has been referred for disposition under the First Offender Program.

Teen Court Program: Texas Family Code Section 54.032

A juvenile court may defer adjudication proceedings during an adjudication hearing for not more than 180 days if the child:

(1) is alleged to have engaged in conduct indicating a need for supervision that violated a penal law of Texas of the grade of misdemeanor that is punishable by a fine only or a penal ordinance of a political subdivision of Texas;

(2) waives the privilege against self-incrimination and testifies under oath that the allegations are true;

(3) presents to the court an oral or written request to attend a teen court program; and

(4) has not successfully completed a teen court program for the violation of the same penal law or ordinance in the two years preceding the date that the alleged conduct occurred.

Note: The teen court program must be approved by the court.

Adjudication Hearing: Texas Family Code Section 54.03

This is what is commonly referred to as the "guilty-not guilty" phase of a trial. A child may be found to have engaged in delinquent conduct or conduct indicating a need for supervision only after an adjudication hearing. The child is presumed innocent unless and until the prosecution proves that the child is guilty of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden of proof is on the state. The verdict must be unanimous.

At the beginning of an adjudication hearing the juvenile court judge shall explain to the child and his parent, guardian, or guardian ad litem: the allegations made against the child; the nature and possible consequences of the proceedings; the child's privilege against self-incrimination; the child's right to trial and to confront witnesses; the child's right to representation by an attorney if he is not already represented; and the child's right to a trial by jury.

Only material, relevant, and competent evidence in accordance with the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence may be considered in an adjudication hearing. Hearsay testimony is generally not admissible. A statement made by the child out of court is insufficient to support a finding of delinquent conduct or conduct indicating a need for supervision unless it is corroborated in whole or in part by other evidence. An adjudication of delinquent conduct or conduct indicating a need for supervision cannot be had upon testimony of an accomplice unless corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the child with the alleged delinquent conduct or conduct indicating a need for supervision; and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the alleged conduct. Finally, evidence illegally seized or obtained is inadmissible in an adjudication hearing.

A child may be found guilty of committing a lesser-included offense of the offense charged.

If the judge or jury finds that the child did engage in delinquent conduct or conduct indicating a need for supervision, then the court or jury shall state which of the allegations in the petition were found to be established by the evidence. The court will then set a date and time for the disposition hearing.

If the judge or jury finds that the child did not engage in delinquent conduct or conduct indicating a need for supervision, the court shall dismiss the case with prejudice.

Disposition Hearing: Texas Family Code Section 54.04

This term can be confusing. What we're talking about here is the "sentencing" phase of the proceedings. The disposition hearing only comes into play if the child has been found guilty of the delinquent conduct or criminal activity alleged in the petition. If the child is found not guilty of all allegations during the adjudication hearing then there is no disposition hearing.

The disposition hearing is separate, distinct, and subsequent to the adjudication hearing. There is no right to a jury at the disposition hearing unless the child is in jeopardy of a determinate sentence as approved by the grand jury. If the child is eligible for determinate sentencing, then the child is entitled to a jury of 12 persons to determine the sentence.

At the disposition hearing, the juvenile court may consider written reports from probation officers, professional court employees, or professional consultants in addition to the testimony of witnesses. Prior to the disposition hearing, the child's lawyer is to have received all written matter to be considered in disposition. No disposition may be made unless the child is in need of rehabilitation or the protection of the public or the child requires that disposition be made. No disposition placing the child on probation outside the child's home may be made under this section unless the court or jury finds that the child, in the child's home, cannot be provided the quality of care and level of support and supervision that the child needs to meet the conditions of probation. If the judge or jury grant probation, the court will attach various conditions of the probation. Depending on the nature of the charges and the child's criminal history, if probation is not granted, the child could be sentenced to a term of confinement in the Texas Youth Commission.

Payment of Probation Fees: Texas Family Code Section 54.061

If a child is placed on probation, the juvenile court, after giving the child, parent, or other person responsible for the child's support, a reasonable opportunity to be heard, shall order the child, parent, or other person, if financially able to do so, to pay to the court a fee of not more than $15 a month during the period that the child continues on probation. If the court finds that a child, parent, or other person responsible for the child's support is financially unable to pay the probation fee, the court shall enter into the records of the child's case a statement of that finding.

Monitoring School Attendance: Texas Family Code Section 54.043

If the court places a child on probation and requires as a condition of probation that the child attend school, the probation officer shall monitor the child's school attendance and report to the court if the child is voluntarily absent from school.

Restitution: Texas Family Code Section 54.048

A juvenile court, in a disposition hearing, may order restitution to be made by the child and the child's parents. This applies regardless of whether the petition in the case contains a plea for restitution.

Admission of Unadjudicated Conduct: Section 54.045

During a disposition hearing, a child may admit having engaged in delinquent conduct or conduct indicating a need for supervision for which the child has not been adjudicated and request the court to take the admitted conduct into account in the disposition of the child's pending case. If the prosecutor agrees in writing, then the court may take the admitted conduct into account in the disposition of the child. However, a court may take into account admitted conduct over with exclusive venue lies in another county only if the court obtains the written permission of the prosecuting attorney for that county. A child may not be adjudicated by any court for having engaged in conduct taken into account under this section unless the conduct taken into account included conduct that took place in another county and the written permission of the prosecuting attorney of that county was not obtained.

Community Service: Texas Family Code Section 54.044

If the court places a child on probation, the court shall require as a condition of probation that the child work a specified number of hours at a community service project approved by the court and designated by the juvenile probation department. This requirement may be waived if the court finds that the child is physically or mentally incapable of participating in the project or that participating in the project will be a hardship on the child or his family or that the child has shown good cause that community service should not be required.

Note: The court may also order that the child's parent perform community service with the child.

Child Placed on Probation for Conduct Involving a Handgun:

Texas Family Code Section 54.0406

(a) If a court or jury places a child on probation for conduct that violates a penal law that includes as an element of the offense the possession, carrying, using, or exhibiting of a handgun, and if at the adjudication hearing the court or the jury affirmatively finds that the child personally possessed, carried, used, or exhibited a handgun, the court must require as a condition of probation that the child, not later than the 30th day after the date the court places the child on probation, notify the juvenile probation officer who is supervising the child of the manner in which the child acquired the handgun, including the date and place of any person involved in the acquisition. The juvenile probation officer is then to relay any relevant information regarding the handgun to the police. Your lawyer should be with you when this takes place.

Note: Information provided by the child to the juvenile probation officer regarding the acquisition of the handgun and any other information derived from that information may not be used as evidence against the child in any juvenile or criminal proceeding.

Rights of Appeal: Warning: Texas Family Code Section 54.034

Before the court may accept a child's plea or stipulation of evidence in a proceeding under this title, the court must inform the child that if the court accepts the plea or stipulation and the court makes a disposition in accordance with the agreement between the state and the child regarding the disposition of the case, the child may not appeal an order of the court pursuant to an adjudication hearing, a disposition hearing, or a hearing to modify disposition, unless the court gives the child permission to appeal; or the appeal is based on a matter raised by written motion filed before the proceeding in which the child entered the plea or agreed to the stipulation of evidence. An appeal from an order of a juvenile court is to the court of appeals and the case may be carried to the Texas Supreme Court by writ of error or upon certificate, as in civil cases generally. The requirements governing a juvenile appeal are as in civil cases generally.

Note: An appeal does not suspend the order of the juvenile court, nor does it release the child from the custody of that court or of the person, institution, or agency to whose care the child is committed, unless the juvenile court so orders. However, the appellate court may provide for a personal bond pending the appeal.

Sealing Juvenile Records: Texas Family Code Section 58.003

One of the most important things that can be done for a juvenile is to get the juvenile records sealed as soon as allowed by law.

The benefits of sealing a child's juvenile records are immense. Once the records are sealed, information relating to the arrest, detention, prosecution, and conviction, are physically sealed and/or destroyed. This means that the child can start adulthood with a "clean" slate. And it also means that the child is authorized by law to say that he has never been convicted.

Section 58.003 of the Texas Family Code provides that, except for juveniles who received a determinate sentence for engaging in delinquent conduct that violated a penal law such as murder, capital murder, manslaughter, aggravated kidnapping, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, aggravated assault, injury to a child/elderly/disabled person, arson, indecency with a child, etc., or engaged in habitual felony conduct, the juvenile records may be sealed if the court finds that 2 years have elapsed since final discharge of the person or since the last official action in the person's case if there was no adjudication; and if since that time the person has not been convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude or found to have engaged in delinquent conduct or conduct indicating a need for supervision and no proceeding is pending seeking conviction or adjudication.

A court may also order the sealing of records concerning a juvenile adjudicated as having engaged in delinquent conduct that violated a penal law of the grade of felony (not including many determinate sentences) if: the person is 21 years of age or older; the person was not transferred by a juvenile court to an adult criminal court for prosecution; the records have not been used as evidence in the punishment phase of a criminal proceeding under Article 37.07, Code of Texas Criminal Procedure; and if the person has not been convicted of a penal law of the grade of felony after becoming age 17.

If a child is referred to the juvenile court for conduct constituting any offense and at the adjudication hearing (guilt/innocence) the child is found to be not guilty of each offense alleged, the court shall immediately order the sealing of all files and records relating to the case.

David Finn is board certified in criminal law by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization. Call today for a free initial consultation.


The information contained in this web site is intended to convey general information about David Finn, PC. It should not be construed as legal advice or opinion. It is not an offer to represent you, nor is it intended to create an attorney-client relationship. Any email sent via the Internet to David Finn, PC using email addresses listed in this web site would not be confidential and would not create an attorney-client relationship.

Impending transfer of physical possession of the children or a trial court’s unreasonable delay in entering an educational institution to a prison pip

Send this document to a colleague Close This Window


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS



════════════

No. 04-1043

════════════



In re Texas Department of Family and Protective Services





════════════════════════════════════════════════════

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus

════════════════════════════════════════════════════





Justice Wainwright delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Jefferson, Justice Hecht, Justice Brister, Justice Medina, Justice Green, Justice Johnson, and Justice Willett joined.



Justice O’Neill filed a dissenting opinion.





We deny Joy Higdon’s motion for rehearing. We withdraw our opinion of September 22, 2006 and substitute the following in its place.

Section 263.401 of the Texas Family Code establishes a deadline for rendition of a final order in suits affecting the parent-child relationship (SAPCRs) brought by the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services. Although the trial court abused its discretion in failing to dismiss the Department’s case, we conclude that here, the parties challenging the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss under section 263.401 had an adequate remedy by accelerated appeal.

On January 23, 2003, the Department filed a SAPCR to terminate the parent–child relationship between Joy Higdon and her two children. That day, the trial court entered an ex parte order giving the Department the authority to take possession of the children, naming the Department temporary managing conservator, and setting the matter for a full adversarial hearing on February 3, 2003. Apparently, Higdon was restored as managing conservator of the children at the February hearing but agreed to place the children with their great-grandmother, Ruby Ludwig.

The trial court held periodic status hearings. In a temporary order dated August 19, 2003, the trial court appointed the Department temporary managing conservator and identified the dismissal date for the case as August 16, 2004. The children continued to reside with Ludwig. In September, the trial court identified the dismissal date for the Department’s case as January 26, 2004, and set the case for trial on the merits. In January, the trial court extended the dismissal date to July 24, 2004, as permitted by section 263.401(b) of the Texas Family Code. On February 23, 2004, Ludwig intervened, seeking sole managing conservatorship of the children.

On Monday, July 19, 2004, the trial began. On Thursday, July 22, 2004, Ludwig and Higdon filed motions to dismiss for failure to render a final order before the statutory deadline. The Department rested its case on Friday, July 23, 2004. Saturday, July 24, 2004, was the dismissal deadline identified by the court in its January order. The trial recommenced on Tuesday, July 27, 2004. On July 28, 2004, the jury returned a unanimous verdict terminating the parent-child relationship between Higdon and each child and appointing the Department, rather than Ludwig, as sole managing conservator of the children. The trial court announced the verdict from the bench, terminated the parental rights of the fathers of the children, and denied the motions to dismiss. A hearing for entry of judgment was set for August 11, 2004. The trial court rendered judgment on Higdon’s parental rights and Ludwig’s intervention when it signed and filed the final decree of termination on August 13, 2004.

On August 11, 2004 and August 12, 2004, Ludwig and Higdon, respectively, filed petitions for writ of mandamus with the court of appeals seeking to compel the trial court to dismiss the case for failure to render a final order before the dismissal date. On October 21, 2004, the court of appeals granted mandamus relief and ordered the trial court to dismiss the Department’s case. On November 18, 2004, the court of appeals denied the Department’s motion for rehearing, correctly noting that Ludwig’s intervention would be unaffected by the dismissal of the Department’s SAPCR. The next day, the Department filed a petition for writ of mandamus in this Court and a motion to stay further proceedings. This Court granted the motion to stay.

Mandamus relief is proper only to correct a clear abuse of discretion when there is no adequate remedy by appeal. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135‑36 (Tex. 2004); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. 1992). The issuance of mandamus by the court of appeals is improper if the trial court did not abuse its discretion or if the record fails to demonstrate the lack of an adequate remedy on appeal. In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 135‑36; Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Tex. 1985). A trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to apply the law correctly, so we consider the trial court’s legal ruling. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839-40.

In construing a statute, our objective is to determine and give effect to the Legislature’s intent. McIntyre v. Ramirez, 109 S.W.3d 741, 745 (Tex. 2003). To determine the Legislature’s intent, we look to the statute’s plain language and the common meaning of the statute’s words. Id. Subsection 263.401(a) of the Texas Family Code requires a trial court to dismiss a SAPCR filed by the Department if a final order has not been rendered by the first Monday after the one-year anniversary of the date when the trial court appointed the Department temporary managing conservator. The statute allows a maximum extension of 180 days. Tex. Fam. Code § 263.401(b), (c). If the trial court has not rendered a final order at the expiration of the additional 180 days, the court must dismiss the SAPCR. Id. § 263.401(c). Section 263.403, entitled “Monitored Return of Child to Parent,” provides an exception to the dismissal rule, but it is not applicable to this case.

Higdon argues the time period described in subsection 263.401(a) began running on the day the trial court entered its ex parte orders. She calculates the first Monday after the one-year anniversary of the January 23, 2003 ex parte order as January 26, 2004. After adding a 180-day extension, she argues the dismissal deadline was Saturday, July 24, 2004. The Department argues that the January 23, 2003 ex parte order that gave the Department temporary conservatorship did not trigger the section 263.401 time period. Instead, the Department contends that the period began after the August 11, 2003 hearing, making the dismissal deadline August 15, 2004.

The Department obtained temporary managing conservatorship by order of the trial court on January 23, 2003. Thus, the statutory time period started on January 23rd because a court “rendered a temporary order appointing the department as temporary managing conservator.” Tex. Fam. Code § 263.401(a). Nothing in the statute excludes the Department’s fourteen-day conservatorship obtained through the ex parte order from the calculation of the dismissal deadline in section 263.401. We therefore determine the deadline to be the date of the Monday following the one-year anniversary of January 23, 2003, which is January 26, 2004.

On January 26, 2004, the trial court held a permanency hearing at which the court concluded that a 180-day extension of this dismissal deadline was in the best interest of the children, as permitted by subsection 263.401(b) of the Texas Family Code and set the dismissal date for July 24, 2004. We agree that July 24, 2004 was the dismissal deadline for the Department’s SAPCR. The trial court erred when it failed to render a final order by that deadline.

Parties may waive complaints about a trial court’s failure to render a timely final order. Section 263.402 describes the vehicles by which a party can obtain a dismissal: a timely motion to dismiss or a motion requesting the court to render a final order before the deadline for dismissal. A timely motion to dismiss must be filed before the Department introduces all of its evidence, other than rebuttal evidence. Id. § 263.402(b). A motion requesting the court to render a final order must be made before the dismissal deadline passes. Id. The Department argues that Ludwig’s and Higdon’s motions to dismiss were not timely made.

On July 19, 2004, the trial began. On Thursday, July 22, 2004, Ludwig and Higdon made motions to dismiss based on the Saturday, July 24 dismissal deadline. The Department rested its case on Friday, July 23. On Wednesday, July 28, 2004, the jury returned a unanimous verdict terminating the parent-child relationship between Higdon and each child and appointing the Department, rather than Ludwig, sole managing conservator of the children. The trial court read the verdict, terminated the parental rights of the fathers, and denied both motions to dismiss. Higdon and Ludwig complied with the statutory deadline by filing before the Department rested and had ripe motions to dismiss before the trial court when the deadline passed. The trial court abused its discretion by failing to dismiss the Department’s SAPCR within the statutory time period as requested by Higdon’s and Ludwig’s timely motions.

Now we must determine whether the court of appeals correctly concluded that Higdon and Ludwig had no adequate remedy by appeal and were therefore entitled to mandamus relief. Although we have recognized that the standard’s “operative word, ‘adequate’, has no comprehensive definition” and demands a “careful balance of jurisprudential considerations that determine when appellate courts will use original mandamus proceedings to review the actions of lower courts,” mandamus will not issue when the law provides another plain, adequate, and complete remedy. In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 135‑36; see also Iley v. Hughes, 311 S.W.2d 648, 652 (Tex. 1958).

However, “[j]ustice demands a speedy resolution” in cases involving child custody. See Proffer v. Yates, 734 S.W.2d 671, 673 (Tex. 1987). In fact, we have acknowledged that appeal “is frequently inadequate to protect the rights of parents and children . . . .” Id. (granting mandamus relief for a trial court’s failure to transfer a custody dispute to the required venue). The Legislature enacted section 263.405, which provides an accelerated appeal that shortens deadlines, expedites filing of the appellate record, and requires the appellate court to “render its final order or judgment with the least possible delay,” to address this concern. Tex. Fam. Code § 263.405(a); see House Comm. On Juvenile Justice & Family Issues, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 2249, 77th Leg., R.S. (2001) (“House bill 2249 addresses post-judgment appellate delays . . . .”); see also Tex. Fam. Code § 263.405 (expediting appeals of final orders rendered under subchapter E “Final Order for Child under Department Care”); id. § 263.304 (authorizing parties to seek mandamus relief to compel a court to comply with certain duties). Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 28 provides other mechanisms for expediting appeals involving the termination of parental rights.

In this case, Higdon and Ludwig filed their motions to dismiss during trial. Because the trial was underway when the dismissal deadline passed and because physical possession of the children had already transferred to the Department when the petition for writ of mandamus was filed with the court of appeals, we conclude that an accelerated appeal provided an adequate remedy in this case. We do not hold that a party complaining of a trial court’s failure to dismiss a SAPCR within the statutory deadline could never be entitled to mandamus relief, but under the facts of this case, we cannot conclude that an accelerated appeal was not an adequate remedy. Impending transfer of physical possession of the children or a trial court’s unreasonable delay in entering a final decree might alter this conclusion, but this record raises neither concern. In fact, because the trial court entered the final decree on August 13, 2004, Ludwig and Higdon could have initiated an accelerated appeal under section 263.403 of the Texas Family Code at worst two days after they filed their petitions for writ of mandamus.

We recognize that in particular cases the statute could work injustice or encourage gamesmanship to push litigation beyond the deadline. We presume the Legislature recognized this also. But the Legislature also recognized that a statutory deadline would expedite the trial of these cases to help provide a modicum of certainty for children whose family situations are subject to the outcomes in these proceedings. It is not the Court’s task to choose between competing policies addressed by legislative drafting. See McIntyre, 109 S.W.3d at 748. We apply the mandates in the statute as written.

For these reasons, we conclude that the court of appeals erred in granting Ludwig’s and Higdon’s petitions for writ of mandamus. We conditionally grant the Department’s petition for writ of mandamus because Higdon and Ludwig had an adequate remedy by appeal. Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.8(c) and without hearing oral argument, we direct the court of appeals to vacate its order to the trial court directing the trial court to dismiss the case. The writ will issue only if the court of appeals does not comply.





________________________________________

J. Dale Wainwright

Justice





OPINION DELIVERED: December 15, 2006

What is the Matrix......follow the white rabbit.......I'm late, I'm late, for a very imp.....

SEAL LYRICS

"Crazy"

In a church by the face
He talks about the people going under
Only child know
A man decides after seventy years
That what he goes there for
Is to unlock the door
While those around him criticize and sleep
And through a fractal on that breaking wall
I see you my friend and touch your face again
Miracles will happen as we trip
But we're never gonna survive unless
We get a little crazy
No we're never gonna survive unless
We are a little
Cray cray crazy
Crazy are the people walking through my head
One of thems got a gun to shoot the other one
And yet together they were friends at school
Get it, get it, get it, yeah!
If all were there when we first took the pill
Then maybe then maybe then maybe then maybe
Miracles will happen as we speak
But we're never gonna survive unless
We get a little crazy
No we're never gonna survive unless
We are a little
Crazy
No no we'll never survive unless we get a little bit
A man decides to go along after seventy years
Oh darlin
In a sky full of people only some want to fly
Isn't that crazy
In a world full of people only some want to fly
Isn't that crazy
Crazy
In a heaven of people there's only some want to fly
Ain't that crazy
Oh babe Oh darlin'
In a world full of people there's only some want to fly
Isn't that crazy
Isn't that crazy Isn't that crazy Isn't that crazy
Ohh
But we're never gonna survive unless we get a little crazy crazy
No we're never gonna to survive unless we are a little crazy
But we're never gonna survive unless we get a little crazy crazy
No we're never gonna to survive unless we are a little crazy
No no never survive unless we get a little bit
And then you see things
The size of which you've never known before
They'll break it
Someday
Only child know
Them things
The size
Of which you've never known before
Someday


[ www.azlyrics.com ]

what about benchmarking and performance management? All these concepts and methods refers to the metrics and values associated with them...

Balanced Scorecard Designer Software

[SOLUTIONS] [DOWNLOAD] [ORDERING] [SUPPORT] [PRESS] [PARTNERS] [TESTIMONIALS] [ABOUT US]





Welcome to Balanced Scorecard Designer!

Balanced Scorecard Designer (BSC Designer) is a tool that supports building a Balanced Scorecard system for a company, department or for a sole person. This program helps to build a Balanced Score Card system.




Click to view Strategy2Act screenshots Click to view screenshots of BSC Designer







Balanced Scorecard implementation of metrics Specialized BSC software provides a wide range of capabilities for successful implementation and maintenance of the Balanced Scorecard.

HR Metrics and Balanced Scorecard.

Human resource function has serious impact on general business performance. Learn how to measure and control HR performance.


We share best "how-to" ideas:



Subscribe to Balanced Scorecard ideas newsletter provided for free by authors of Strategy2Act. You will have 1-2 emails every week with balanced scorecard ideas and tips.

Email:



In Strategy2Act newsletter we publish Balanced Scorecard (BSC) related issues and Strategy2Act features review.


Balanced Scorecard Designer

New! A brand-new Balanced Scorecard Designer software was released. Click to visit home page.

Balanced Scorecard is a well-known concept, but what about KPI, what about benchmarking and performance management? All these concepts and methods refers to the metrics and values associated with them...

Recently released products:

* New! Web-site investment metrics
* New! Presentation KPI and Scorecard
* New! Supply Chain Balanced Scorecard KPI
* Help Desk Balanced Scorecard Metrics
* Training Balanced Scorecard Metrics
* Brand Evaluation Metrics
* Marketing Balanced Scorecard metrics
* Real Estate Scorecard metrics for Excel
* Sales Balanced Scorecard metrics for Excel
* HR Balanced Scorecard metrics in Excel
* HR Hire Balanced Scorecard metrics in Excel
* Call-Center Balanced Scorecard metrics in Excel
* IT Security Balanced Scorecard metrics in Excel

Download Whitepaper: Balanced Scorecard Design Toolkit

Metrics with "in design" status: ERP and CRM, Public Relations, Taxes

Measure HR performance with HR metrics

HR metrics are a flexible tool that HR managers can use to measure the own performance, that CEOs can use to measure the performance of their HR department.

IT balanced scorecard - IT Security Metrics and Balanced Scorecard. Implement a balanced security strategy in your company - use IT security metrics represented as a balanced scorecard.

Balanced Scorecard software list. There a number of Balanced Scorecard tools. Why choose Strategy2Act among them? The answers are: "to try balanced scorecard concept in action", "to have a deeper insight of balanced scorecard".

Create a strategy tree basing Balanced Scorecard methodology. In this article we show how to create and describe your strategy with Strategy2Act software.
Interested in strategy maps? See Mind Pad for: balanced scorecard maps, cause and effect diagrams, security and quality management;

Measure and control business performance with Strategy2Act and Mind Pad. (39 pages, 746 KB)

Get Balanced Scorecard Designer

Download the latest fully-function 30-days evaluation version of Balanced Scorecard Designer. Note: you can use the evaluation version for 30-days with no functional limitation. Download Balanced Scorecard software now...

Obtain Support

Our Customer Service Center acts as a single point of entry for all implementation and product-related queries. Our intention is to ensure that your service requests are prioritized and resolved in an efficient and timely manner. Obtain support now...

Order Balanced Scorecard Designer

You can buy Balanced Scorecard Designer by filling online purchase form. You can also buy using FAX Order, Postal Mail, Phone or Purchase Order. The prices are all quoted in US Dollars. Order Balanced Scorecard software now...











Balanced Scorecard Designer helps to measure and control business performance using Scorecard and KPI tools. Balanced Scorecard Designer helps to measure and control business performance using Scorecard and KPI tools.

Whitepaper: Balanced Scorecard Design Toolkit

With Balanced Scorecard Designer you can build a Balanced Scorecard (KPI) system for your company, department or for your own.

Syndicated business measure news



Download Strategy2Act brochure as PDF.

Download PDF version of the Strategy2Act brochure

Download size: 86 Kb;

Download brochure.

Balanced Scorecard as a Life Strategy. A lot of companies succeeded owing to this strategy, but now the subject is a bit different: If you could use “Balanced Scorecard” in your own life?

Connect strategy to action, create a Scorecard. Everyone within your organization must have an idea about relation between local tasks and global strategy.


Balanced Scorecard, Strategy Tree, Scorecard and Excel reports With Strategy2Act program you can easily create a Balanced Scorecard document, Scorecard report and Excel report

Balanced Scorecard transforms strategy into action. There are three important things you should know about Balanced Scorecard: It’s a concept (not a set of rules, tools or methods); It helps to connect your strategy with real action; It lets to describe companies’ strategy, vision and mission;


Made in Devoler

Copyright © 2000--2007 AKS-Labs. All rights reserved.